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First to Last—The Truth—News—Editorials—Advertisements.

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German Defeat.

Some weeks ago there was printed in these columns an article setting forth the belief of The Tribune that Germany had been beaten. The article was widely discussed, both in this country and abroad, the foreign comment naturally flowing from the satisfaction Allied journals derived from an American expression of opinion wholly favorable to their cause. German comment and the comment of German-American journals was derisive and for reasons equally patent.

It is perhaps pertinent now to extend the discussion to other than strictly military considerations and emphasize again the extent to which the war has already been a disappointment to German expectation, has been, in fact, a defeat, and is developing into a something which may soon turn out to be a true national disaster.

In entering the war Germany hoped and expected to defeat France and Russia with ease. Her statesmen counted not perhaps upon permanent British neutrality, but upon a temporary paralysis of British statesmanship, which would permit her generals to repeat the success of 1870 and enable her to confront Great Britain with a stupendous accomplished fact.

The prompt entrance of Great Britain into the war wholly transformed the situation and, despite the military failure of the British to the present moment, has been the dominant factor in the defeat of Germany; that is, in the foiling and thwarting of what were the main purposes of German statesmanship at the beginning.

In losing control of the sea, or rather in losing the ability to use the sea, Germany lost a decisive battle far more serious than that at the Marne. The final suppression of the submarine campaign, which survives now only as sporadic raids succeed in sinking an occasional ship of relatively small importance, ended the naval phase of the war and brought what is, so far, the only decision in any campaign that has been opened.

German statesmanship and military command alike reckoned that it was essential to destroy France promptly, before Russia came up. But this was the calculation before Great Britain enlisted. After Great Britain came in there were twice as good reasons for eliminating France, because unless France were eliminated Germany would presently have to deal with both France and Great Britain on the Western front.

Now, taking the war as a contest between France and Great Britain on the one hand and Germany on the other, what has happened? First of all, Germany has occupied some 8,400 square miles of French territory. That area had a population of some 2,500,000 before the war, but all the men were cleared out before Germany came, by the mobilization. It contained the busiest industrial plants, the richest coal and iron mines. The possession of both has been of great advantage to Germany, and France has suffered severely by the loss of them.

But, on the other hand, Germany has lost all of her colonies; most of them have been actually conquered; only German East Africa is still practically intact, and even here the British have occupied the coast. All German colonial investments have been swept away. This is, however, only a relatively minor loss compared with the loss of the use of the seas. Germany is above all else a country highly industrialized, which lives by exporting its products, of Germany efficiency, to all parts of the world. She is not self-supporting in the sense that France is, but, like Great Britain, she is primarily a factory, her national income depends on the returns she gets for her manufactures, plus the freight her great merchant marine earns in transporting these products and bringing back raw materials and food.

The right to use the sea Germany can only regain in two ways—by compelling Great Britain to relinquish command of the seas or by complying with the terms fixed by Great Britain as the price of the use of the seas. One would be the consequence of victory, the other of defeat. But up to the present moment Germany has not been able in the smallest way to exert any force upon Great Britain to compel her to give up the mastery of the seas. Every effort made by the Germans has ended in decisive defeat.

If you set against the German occupation of 8,400 square miles of French territory the British control of the sea, you have measured the exact condition between the contending powers of the West. It is plain that no hardship of France is comparable with that of Germany, because France, thanks to British sea power, is able to get coal and iron from abroad. She has now been able to reorganize her industrial establishments in such fashion that what used to be made at Lille and at Roubaix, at St. Quentin and Tourcoing—that is, the things essential to national life and comfort—are made elsewhere.

In addition, France has lost many men

and a few districts have been ravaged, either by reason of the actual conflict or because of German wantonness. This represents a capital loss, but it does not represent a capital loss greatly in excess of that suffered by Germany in her colonies and in the paralysis or destruction of her merchant marine. As for French casualties, they are certainly not in excess of German proportionately, and British are so far inconsiderable, compared with German—2,250,000 for the latter against 500,000 for the former, according to the last official figures. It should be noted, too, that the German figures are for Prussia alone, whose population is not far from that of Great Britain.

Now, if peace were to be considered to-day, it is plain that Germany would have to evacuate France, and Belgium as well. In no other way could she persuade the British to permit her ships to sail the seas, and she has no present means of compelling such British consent. But this would be to restore things to their exact status before the war. It would mean that for her tremendous sacrifices Germany had gained nothing from France or from Great Britain, but had lost her colonies.

Conceivably the British would not make such a bargain. Then what? Either Germany would have to offer more or she would have to continue in a condition which meant paralysis to her industrial establishments. She might make peace with France, with Russia, with all her Continental enemies, but she would not be one step nearer the freedom of the seas than was Napoleon after he had conquered the Continent. She could, to be sure, send her manufactures to Russia and to France, if they were prepared to resume friendly relations, but would they be?

Here one strikes at the heart of the real disaster that this war has already foreshadowed for German industry. Before the war Germany dominated Russian markets; she was able, through the terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt, to sell advantageously in France. But both Russia and France have taken back their economic freedom and both have strongly indicated their purpose to discriminate hereafter against German manufactures. Unquestionably British products, and those of the United States conceivably, will receive more favorable tariff treatment than German when the war is over. Again, up to the present moment Great Britain has competed with Germany on a parity in her home markets and in those of her colonies. Nothing is more certain than that after the war there will be imperial preference, and probably international preference, between France and Great Britain and their respective colonies.

In France and Russia and Great Britain—to some extent even in Italy, not yet at war with Germany—the bases of German commerce have been swept away. In addition there has been created anti-German feeling which will not disappear for years and will act against German interests. In such a simple matter as shipping it is entirely unlikely that France or Great Britain will ever again permit Germany to use their harbors as ports of call in the transatlantic trade and in the Mediterranean and Far East transport.

To offset this, what has Germany gained? Her conquests in Belgium and France are valueless, save only as they provide a basis for bargaining with Britain over the blockade. They look imposing on the map, but actually Germany is in the position of a burglar who has got into a house and gathered up the silver, but cannot get away with it. He has it, but it is of no immediate value and he is prepared to trade it at any moment for his freedom of action, which corresponds with Germany's freedom of the seas.

In her war with Great Britain and France, then, it must be plain that Germany has been beaten. She has lost more than she has gained. Her temporary occupation of French territory does not counterbalance the loss of the use of the oceans, the loss of her colonies, the hardships incident to the blockade. If she held enough territory to cripple French resistance, if what she held was the vital portion of France and her possession constituted a wound through which France was bleeding to death, it would be different, but this is not the case. She holds one-twenty-fifth part of the French home area; the portion of the population left in it is of no military value. All she actually gains is through the coal and iron mines which yield her products. But France gets coal and iron by sea from Britain and the United States, while Germany cannot get food in any market.

Turning to the East, it is clear that here Germany has, with her Austrian ally, made very great conquests. She holds all of Russian Poland and Serbia. She can annex Poland when she chooses; she may be able to stretch the war to the point where Russia will consent to surrender and persuade her allies to make peace, ceding Poland to Austria and Germany. All the Allies may agree to abandon Serbia, a year hence, and leave the Central Powers an unrestricted road to the Near East. But it must be recognized that until such a treaty is signed Germany is still industrially paralyzed, for the loss of the freedom of the seas remains.

Conceivably the war will wear out and the peace will be signed on the basis of German achievement in the East, together with her consent to restore on the West the conditions of 1914. Germany would thus be, on the map, the master of a great central empire, stretching from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. But would Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, to say nothing of Poland, consent to be fused in any such empire for any length of time? Probably only a few Germans dream of undertaking to make a political entity of such a heterogeneous mass of states, but anything less than this would be nothing, for each of these states—that is, Austria-Hungary,

Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece, to say nothing of the Serbs, whether they retain their freedom or not—would presently follow their own fortunes, which cannot long run parallel with German.

A central empire dominated and controlled by Germany would be a menace to the whole of Europe and as such would keep alive the present Quadruple Alliance, even though it loses this war, so far as Eastern Europe is concerned. Such a central empire, from its very character, would be threatened by revolt from the various subject races, and the alliance of the other nations would necessarily select the proper moment to strike, promising to the various subject races their freedom and thus making a common cause against the German master.

Perhaps Germany would succeed in winning the loyalty of all these various races, but she has not succeeded with the Poles in Posen, the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes in Schleswig, and she has not been too fortunate with the Belgians her latest conquest. Short of complete supremacy there could be no supremacy in such an empire, and at no distant date Poland, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria would resume their complete independence. This would leave Germany nothing for her sacrifices in the present war; it might leave her territorially smaller if the Poles of Posen and the Prussians were able to join their brethren.

But it is wholly unlikely that Germany will attempt to create an empire of the sort that is foreshadowed by her most romantic publicists. The perils are too great and the chance that Europe, still unconquered, would consent to it is too small. What she seems now to be asking for is merely the joint occupation of Poland with Austria and the partition of Serbia between Austria and Bulgaria, thus giving her an open road to Constantinople through the territories of her allies. Granted that both conditions of peace are finally imposed upon Europe, will the profit be commensurate with German effort, losses, with her 3,000,000 casualties and \$9,000,000,000 debt?

Obviously not. A change in political control in Constantinople, in Bulgaria, would cut her road to the Golden Horn. Austrian statesmanship might turn away from Berlin leading strings if assured of Russian and British support. As for Poland, if European history in the last two centuries means anything, it means that the Poles will ultimately be free, and their freedom threatens German unity in the East.

No one at all well informed now questions the assertion that Germany would consent to peace now, if in return for the evacuation of Belgium and Northern France she were permitted to hold Poland, while Austria held Serbia. Germans have suggested the cession of Metz to France, Austria and Germany have offered Italy the Trentino, Gorizia and Albania. But such terms mean that the war is a lost war for Germany. It means a lost war because the profits immediately taken do not even compare with the losses that must be met at the moment of liquidation.

Beyond this lies the fact that Germany will never again have the chance that came in 1914. Great Britain had then an available army of 1,000,000 men. She will necessarily have not less than 500,000 hereafter. But if there had been 500,000 British troops available in August, 1914, would Germany have won at Mons, would she have reached the Marne? Patently not.

And will the men and class that dominated Germany in 1914 be able to persuade the nation to march with them again? Germany believed in 1914, men of all ranks and classes believed, that German superiority was unquestioned, that France and Russia would fall at a blow, that Great Britain was tottering to ruin, that the empire of the world was within the grasp of the German people and that theirs was the mission to reorganize the world on good German principles. It was a national conviction, it represented more than a generation of teaching, but it perished in Champagne, in Flanders and in French Lorraine. Millions of Germans know better now, and the truth will be written in the terms of peace, even if Germany gets what she is now asking.

Germany has lost the war because she cannot now bring home any considerable portion of what she hoped to bring home. She has not crushed France, and she cannot crush France. She has not shaken British sea power, and she cannot shake it. She no longer controls Italy, and she cannot again control Italy, save as she subordinates Austria to Italian interests, and this would be fatal to her own. Germany has, above all, lost the war because she must make terms with the British fleet before she can resume her commercial life, and she has nothing to offer the British in return save only the profits of her first campaign in the west and her colonies, which have passed to the British or are at British mercy already. Meantime she has provided Great Britain with not less than 3,000,000 trained troops, who will be available on the outbreak of any new war.

Conceivably the Germans will get across the Suez Canal into Egypt; it is possible, even though unlikely; but this will not affect British sea power. It will not break the blockade in the North Sea. It will not take India, because Japan is pledged to defend India, if necessary, and Japan is far nearer to India than Germany can get for many years. Germany has lost the war because there is now nothing that she can get which will permanently repay her for her losses, and the provinces that she plans to take now bring with them immediate dangers and future perils.

On the other hand, in the sense that Germany is threatened with annihilation, that she is certain or even likely to be crushed, that she will presently be overrun and partitioned, she has not been beaten, and there is no present prospect that she is likely to be beaten. The Allies are fighting now, not with any clear

political or military purpose, but still in the mood and temper created by Bernhardi and Treitschke, by Belgium, by Louvain, by the Zeppelin raids in Britain, by the Lusitania Massacre and by all other manifestations of German ferocity. They are fighting to punish, not because they have a clear, definite programme. They are still carried along by the intense desire to kill Germans, and by the belief that they can kill so many Germans that no German will ever again dare or care to repeat the crimes of 1914.

Germany has been very largely cured of her madness, despite the boasting of her public speakers. Her dream of world power has vanished in thin air and her people have suffered too terribly to have illusions for many years to come. But her people are not yet so weary that they are prepared to give up German territory to the foreigner, not even Alsace-Lorraine, and they are correct in maintaining that there is no present reason in the military situation why they should. They may be correct in their belief that the Allies will never be able to keep the war going to the point where the German people will abandon the Rhine district.

There will be no peace until the Allies have conquered Germany, "crushed her," as the phrase is, or have tired of the enormous sacrifices the policy of crushing entails. When they tire it will be the simplest thing in the world to make peace terms, so far as France, Italy and Great Britain are concerned. The war as far as Belgium is concerned is over. Germany has lost the war, as a whole, because she went into the war determined to win a world supremacy, and she is coming out of the war, at the very best, heavily burdened with debt, leaving her great foes unbeaten, leaving Great Britain, her chief rival, organized for war on something like a German basis, and having lost the world markets in which she found her greatest prosperity before the war.

Germany lost the war when Winston Churchill mobilized the British fleet in time and Joseph Joffre won the Battle of the Marne. But there will be no peace until the Allies discover that they cannot crush Germany, or succeed in crushing her. Their belief that they can crush her rests very largely on the mental condition created by their passionate anger at German atrocities in the opening days of the war, plus the programme of German megalomanias, academic and militaristic. Europe cured France of the delusion of world power, but she did not crush France. It seems now highly unlikely that Germany can be crushed. But this is not yet the view in London, Paris or Petrograd.

The Vanished Immigrant.

(From The Springfield Republican.)
With the drastic measures taken recently by the British government to prevent the emigration of British subjects of military age, immigration into the United States received its final blow. In the year ended June 30, 1914, more than 800,000 aliens came to this country; but in the year ended June 30 last the net increase of aliens was only about 50,000. In July, August and September of this year, 5,000 more aliens left us than came to us; that is to say, we are now losing population to Europe instead of gaining it. Those who would come here if they could are being held back by force, and many already here have been returned, or are now returning, who are under legal obligation as reservists to serve in European armies.

There is nothing different to expect until the war ends, and meanwhile, unskilled labor in the United States should have the opportunity of generations to improve its economic condition. Railroad laborers may yet ride to their work in palace cars.

High Cost of Education.

(From The Hartford Courant.)
Some idea of the high and increasing cost of education may be obtained from a little bulletin just issued by the Princeton University Press Club. Ten years ago the estimated cost of the buildings at Princeton was \$3,238,840. Since then nineteen new structures have been erected at a cost of \$4,157,480. Thus the amount of capital invested in buildings has been more than doubled. During the ten years the teaching faculty at the university has been increased from 100 to 195, and the amount paid in salaries from \$105,135 yearly to \$401,310. Yet, in the same time the number of students has grown but slightly, from 1,374 to 1,643. With an increase in the number of students of slightly less than 20 per cent, the investment in buildings and the cost of the teaching force have more than doubled.

Veterinarians and Horse Doctors.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: As a regular veterinarian of thirty-five years' continuous practice and a constant reader of The New York Tribune for many years, it was with surprise and very great indignation that I read an article in your issue of December 15 under the caption of "Wilson Picks a Horse Doctor as Coast Survey Head."
I have always entertained a very high opinion of The Tribune and regarded it as conservative yet progressive and honest and fair in all its expressions, but I cannot understand why at this time it sees fit to slander the entire veterinary profession because one of its members has received recognition.
Sixty years ago, when scientifically trained veterinarians were almost unknown in this country, the publication of such an article might have been justified, but fortunately conditions have changed. The veterinarian of to-day is as well and often better educated than members of other learned professions. According to the laws of this state a man must present a high school diploma or its equivalent, a regents' certificate of sixty academic counts, before he can enter a veterinary college. The college course, consisting of the study of technical and scientific subjects only, requires from three to four years.
To contrast the veterinarian of to-day with the old-time horse doctor of twenty years ago, to publish a "Horse Doctor" as the president of the profession, is sure to be misjudged by 999 out of 1,000, is not only an insult but a great injustice to the 15,000 qualified veterinarians in this country, who are struggling to elevate their profession, to gain recognition and confidence.
Personally I am not interested in Dr. Jones, for I do not know him and never heard of him until I saw his name in the article referred to, but I cannot refrain from protesting against this unequalled insult upon the profession of which I am a humble member.
GEORGE H. BERN, D. V. S.
Brooklyn, Dec. 17, 1915.

TO—WHERE?



TERMS OF PEACE.

Race and Solidarity Should Control Political Realignments.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: Your editorial "Allied Terms" was very interesting and read with great attention, as all your editorials are. But it seems to me, in discussing terms for a permanent peace (as some of the English editorials have said) they should be based upon racial lines. The religious side has been overlooked. We know, in the past, that countries composed of different races but of the same religious faith have been more harmonious than those of the same race but of different religions. There is more harmony between Protestant Prussia and Protestant Scandinavia than between Protestant Prussia and Catholic Germany.
All right thinking people agree that Poland should be restored—Russian Poland, Austrian Poland, Prussian Poland. East Prussia should be divided up between Russia and Poland, Russia to have the port of Königsberg and all East Prussia east of that port; Poland to have the territory between Königsberg and the Vistula, giving Poland a window on the Baltic; all of the Province of Posen and that part of Silesia east of the Oder, and Galicia. This would make Poland all Slavic in race, Catholic in religion and Polish in language.
Bohemia and Moravia to form one country and to have all of Silesia west of the Oder and south of the city of Breslau. This would make Bohemia one in race, one in religion and one in language.
Rumania to have Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.
Serbia to have Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slavonia, Croatia and the Dalmatian coast south of the Neretva River, giving Serbia a window on the Adriatic.
Albania to be divided between Montenegro and Greece. Greece to have all of European Turkey, including Constantinople, and the Bulgarian coast bordering on the Aegean Sea, and a twenty-mile line of Asiatic Turkey bordering on the Dardanelles, leaving the Dardanelles free to all nations and unfortified.

Hungary to form an independent nation. Russia to have Persia, to give her a southern outlet.
Finland to be autonomous.
Italy to have all the Adriatic coast of Austria-Hungary west of the mountain range of the Julian and Dinaric Alps; also the Trentino and the Italian cantons of Switzerland.
France to have Alsace-Lorraine and the French cantons of Switzerland.
Switzerland to be given the Austrian Tyrol.
Belgium to be given Luxembourg and the mouth of the Scheldt.
Denmark to be given Schleswig-Holstein. Hanover to be restored to a kingdom.
The present German Empire to be separated into two federations—Prussia, Saxony and Hanover forming one federation, all Protestant in religion; the South German states, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Germany Austria and Switzerland forming a second federation, all Catholic in religion.
These divisions substantially divide Europe into self-governing countries, one language, one race and one religion, as near as it is possible to do so. And if we look at it from a moral point of view, Italy should have Malta; Spain, Gibraltar; and France, the Channel Islands. To compensate Holland for giving up the mouth of the Scheldt to Belgium, her eastern frontier should be extended to the Ems.
If Belgium and Holland had had an offensive and defensive alliance before the outbreak of the war, Germany would never have invaded Belgium to reach France. The present war has demonstrated that guaranteed neutrality is not to be depended upon by small nations.

Germany's object in starting this war was to obtain all of Russia west of a line drawn from Riga, on the Baltic, to Odessa, on the Black Sea, including those two ports; to annex Switzerland and North Italy, to get the port of Genoa. Austria was to have all of the Balkans, including Constantinople. This war must be fought to a finish, so that there will be nothing left to inspire the

Germans to dream such dreams, to let other peoples' property alone and attend strictly to their own affairs.

The Kaiser's ambition was shattered at the Battle of the Marne by General Joffre, the greatest general the great war has produced. France found a Washington and a Lincoln in this great man.
ELLIOTT LYNCH.
New York, Dec. 17, 1915.

Mr. Wilson, Statesman and Prophet.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: Your recent editorials based on historic data are far excellence, but those based on human discernment are flat failures. The "Slight that Lacks Insight" is most marked: your last editorial on President Wilson's "Moral Bankruptcy." Now and again, in human history, a man is found who is both prophet and statesman. Such a combination is rare. What is a prophet but one who sees great principles and knows how to make other men see them? And what is a statesman but one who understands great events and can guide men through them? William Lloyd Garrison was such a prophet, but his counsels were often like the counsel of Aethiophel—folly and foolishness. Edwin M. Stanton was such a statesman as has been referred to; but who can name a syllable or a speech of his that ever deeply moved the heart of our nation? But in Abraham Lincoln America found her prophet-statesman. Why? Because he had the insight that comes from knowledge of great principles and these enabled him to guide many safely through great events.
The partisan-minded are always blind. The principle-minded have not only sight but insight. Why should not such a paper as The Tribune—with its noble, patriotic past—stand on the same level as our First Great American and not only announce itself as American but achieve the heights where Lincoln stood: interpret great events by great principles? Then what you now are pleased to call President Wilson's "Moral Bankruptcy" will be recognized as the moral bulwark of our nation.

HOMER WESLEY HILDRETH,
Minister First Church,
Cromwell, Conn., Dec. 16, 1915.

A Guarantee of Security.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: Your editorial Saturday on Mr. Roosevelt is at once the most amazing and at the same time the most convincing review of the political situation that has been given to the public.
You are doing excellent pioneer work in clearly defining our position in relation to other countries at this critical period of our national existence and in presenting the name of the one man who is preeminently qualified to meet the situation. Politicians may talk tariff and a dozen other subjects in endeavoring to obscure the main issue, but the people are demanding a true American, whose election will be a guarantee of security at home and protection on sea and land the world over.
The policies of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan have discredited us in Mexico and Europe. But, what is far more serious, we have lost our prestige as a nation, and our citizens born in other lands, recognizing the weakness of the administration, are endeavoring to aid the home governments and thus embroil us in the general turmoil. Order will not be established, respect and honor will not return to the flag, until our Executive is equal to the exigency of the occasion. We need a pilot who can take the ship of state through the storm-tossed, tempestuous sea. The man whose firm grasp has held the helm when we sailed through troubled waters can be relied upon to make port.
We want peace. Mr. Roosevelt brought to Russia and Japan peace; he can do more in less time and at less cost in establishing permanent peace than all the peace arks that ever sailed the ocean. Blind and culpable would be that city's Mayor who ordered the police to their barracks and the citizens to throw open their houses as a mob on violence bent thronged the streets, the Mayor claiming such instructions were issued as precautionary measures and were not approved by the rabble. Nations have invited disaster by supineness and self-confidence.
WILLIAM HANFORD.
Norwalk, Conn., Dec. 15, 1915.

STRICT NEUTRALITY.

Nothing to Get Excited About in War or Lusitania.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: You publish a multitude of letters concerning the war and preparedness; many of them are apparently from men of standing and education, and most of them from city-bred people. This is very natural, because your paper is largely read by these classes, and, being capable, they are more ready to express their views.
Perhaps, however, you may be interested in learning the views of a plain, everyday, out-of-town citizen—one of that vast army whose occupation is farming—who has no use to grind, and whose ancestry is purely American since the country was first settled. It is a personal view, of course, but perhaps represents the views of a large portion of American citizens than might be imagined by one residing in a section where there are so many causes to influence people for one side or the other.

In the first place, such phases of the war as which is right and which is wrong—whether wins or which loses—are matters of indifference. We are a nation, not a police force, and have practically no interest in European politics. That other nations should try to drag us into the war is natural. That such efforts should have the support of any American, by speech, by word, or by act, is traitorous. Whether by seeking to stir up animosity against a most desirable class of our citizens; whether by exaggerating and harping on incidents, with the idea of stirring up bad blood; whether by cavilling and sneering at those endeavoring to fulfill their duty by pursuing a course most advantageous to the country as a whole, it is equally disloyal and traitorous as the act of one who, by violence, seeks to injure the nation that has adopted him.

One tragic incident that has been mentioned in the papers is the sinking in certain quarters, but it is doubtful if the great bulk of the population felt very stirred after the facts became known.

That the ship was destroyed in a manner contrary to the dictates of international law may be true. It is difficult, however, for one to see why he should pour out his blood and treasure because a few of his countrymen persisted in patronizing a belligerent vessel under such obviously dangerous conditions. To create a wide sympathy one must at least use ordinary good judgment.

Another thing that is creating a great stir in the papers is the alleged attacking of munition plants. The first thought that occurs is whether or not in doing such a wholesale business in war supplies, we are really neutral. The common sense answer is no. The legal answer may be yes. But in any case isn't it to be expected that the injured nations will feel sore and that certain of their adherents will try to stop it by fair means or foul?

If the means employed are legal, there should be no complaint; let those who profit by the manufacture protect themselves. If illegal means are employed, let them be dealt with according to our laws.
Probably most of the occurrences are pure accident. If there is incendiary, it is an all likelihood sporadic. There is no occasion for hysteria—no call to denounce masses of our best citizens simply on the evidence that their sympathies lean one way or the other. Why shouldn't it be so? It is not our money if certain of our people can make money out of the war legally, well and good. If out of others of our people dislike this and can stop them legally, well and good again. We that have no grumbling to do, probably the great bulk of the nation, simply don't care.

As to preparedness, by all means let us be prepared with an efficient army and with a navy that ranks, not number two but number one. With growing power and influence there is no such thing as friendship among nations.
W. V. P.
Scotland, Md., Dec. 15, 1915.

America's Greatest.

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: I have just found another reason for reading The Tribune.
Allow me to commend you for taking your stand for America's greatest citizen, Theodore Roosevelt.
P. H. J.
New York, Dec. 17, 1915.